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Acquisition System Design Analysis for Improved Cyber 
Security Performance  
Brad R. Naegle, LTC, U.S. Army (Ret.)—is a Senior Lecturer at the Naval Postgraduate School, 
Monterey, CA. In addition to acquisition course development and delivery, he is a member of the 
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Product Manager for the 2½-ton Extended Service Program (ESP) and USMC Medium Tactical 
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Tactical Vehicles from 1996 to 1997. He was the 7th Infantry Division (Light) Division Materiel Officer 
from 1990 to 1993 and the 34th Support Group Director of Security, Plans, and Operations from 1986 
to 1987. Prior to that, LTC (Ret.) Naegle held positions in test and evaluations and logistics fields. He 
earned a Master of Science degree in systems acquisition management (with Distinction) from the 
Naval Postgraduate School and an undergraduate degree in economics from Weber State University. 
He is a graduate of the Command and General Staff College, Combined Arms and Services Staff 
School, and Ordnance Corps Advanced and Basic Courses. 
Abstract 
There is ample evidence that cyber-attacks and cyber warfare are a growing concern 
for the United States. Our warfighting systems and networks have inherent vulnerabilities 
and so are targets for cyber adversaries. By nature, cyber warfare is an asynchronous 
strategy, so the danger posed by a cyber threat is not proportional to the size of the entity 
initiating the attack. The United States’ traditional adversaries, state and non-state actors, 
domestic terrorists, and even individuals can pose an equally dangerous threat. 
The various types and astonishing number of cyber-attacks on the DoD has focused 
efforts to limit exposure to cyber-attacks and mitigate unavoidable vulnerabilities. The most 
effective way to “harden” systems against potential cyber-attacks is to develop the system 
with a cyber warfare mindset. To do this, program managers must have an in-depth 
understanding of their system’s cyber vulnerabilities and exercise control over the design 
and configuration of those vulnerable subsystems. 
There are several challenges in both understanding and controlling a system’s cyber 
vulnerabilities, including that the Defense Acquisition System (DAS) is designed to cede 
most of the design decisions to the contractor. All known and potential cyber vulnerabilities 
need to be treated as system Configuration Item, so that design and configuration is under 
government control. 
Fortunately, there are tools, techniques, and analyses that can augment the DAS to 
gain a better understanding and provide more control over the design and configuration of 
those subsystems presenting cyber vulnerabilities. This research analyzes the integration of 
these tools and the expected improvement in cyber performance resulting from the 
implementation. The tools include the integration of the Maintainability, Upgradeability, 
Interoperability, Reliability, and Safety/Security (MUIRS) analyses; Software Engineering 
Institute’s Quality Attribute Workshop (QAW); Software Engineering Institute’s Architecture 
Trade-off Analysis Methodologysm; and the Failure Modes and Effects Criticality Analysis 
(FMECA). 
Background 
Hardly a day has gone by during my tenure at Cyber Command that we have not 
seen at least one significant cybersecurity event occurring somewhere in the world. We face 
a growing variety of advanced threats from actors who operate with ever-more sophistication 
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and precision. —Admiral Michael S. Rogers, Commander, U.S. Cyber Command (Pellerin, 
2017) 
Threats from cyber-attacks have clearly emerged as one of the most significant 
threats to the United States and to the Department of Defense (DoD). The sources of attack 
are varied and include state and non-state actors, traditional adversaries, as well as 
domestic sources. The emergence of artificial intelligence (AI) cyber-attacks has added to 
the threat significantly. “Automation and artificial intelligence are beginning to ‘make 
profound changes to the cyber domain,’ a threat that the military hasn’t yet fully grasped 
how to counter, Robert Behler, the Defense Department’s director of operational test and 
evaluation, said” (Capaccio, 2019). 
Cyber-attack is an extremely effective, asynchronous warfare tactic, meaning that 
adversaries that could not possibly face the U.S. military can still be very effective in the 
cyber environment. While traditional adversaries like China, Russia, North Korea, and Iran 
are certainly players in the cyber-warfare arena, non-state actors, domestic terrorists, and 
even individuals can pose a disproportionate threat in the cyber world.  
The relatively inexpensive cyber options being employed today by 
both state and non-state hacking groups make it an incredibly efficient 
“leveler” of power. A small group of hackers using simple spear-phishing 
tactics, for example, can have massive impact on military installations, 
government operations, critical infrastructure and potentially even weapons 
systems. (Martini, 2016) 
Obviously, this opens up the cyber-threat adversaries list to an unimaginable number that 
would be nearly impossible to manage or even prioritize. 
The types and sophistication of cyber-attacks are growing exponentially. Denial-of-
Service (DoS) or Directed-Denial-of-Service (DDoS) attacks have impacts on 
communications, networks, internet, intranet, and systems using Global Positioning System 
(GPS) to name a few. Malicious software (malware) is a common cyber-attack methodology 
that can take several forms from passive collection of data to destructive applications 
designed to destroy or disrupt operating systems. Spoofing is the introduction of erroneous 
or misleading information into systems that can dramatically affect operations and can even 
include voice or video communications assembled by AI that appear to be authentic, but are 
compilations from available sources. Can you imagine getting verbal commands in the 
recognized voice of the commander that are realistic in appearance, but totally constructed 
by AI? Take-over of systems is certainly of concern and in 2011, Iran claimed that it took 
over a U.S. RQ-170 surveillance drone, although that is disputed by the United States. It 
was not clear how Iran acquired the drone intact. Some U.S. experts dismiss the possibility 
that Iran could hack and then take over the drone’s controls, as Iran claims. And yet similar 
disruptions have proven possible in other battlefields, notably with the Iran-backed 
Hezbollah militia in Lebanon and drones from Israel.  
“Those jamming capabilities exist, and a lot of them are not as new as we 
would like to imagine,” says former U.S. Navy electronics warfare officer 
Densmore. “Anything that has a sensor, that takes communications links—
as does the RQ-170, which has two, one for the satellite, and the other is 
line-of-sight with the ground control station—all it takes is disrupting that.” 
(Peterson, 2011) 
In 2015, the FBI filed a report regarding a United Airlines passenger who had repeatedly 
gained engine thrust controls of Boeing 737 airliners through the entertainment port: 
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During the conversations, [FBI investigating special agent Mark] 
Hurley wrote, [Chris] Roberts disclosed that he had previously hacked into 
IFE [in-flight entertainment] systems, manufactured by Panasonic and 
Thales—which provide video monitors in the passenger seatbacks—about 
15 or 20 times on various flights between 2011 and 2014. According to the 
document, Roberts said he gained access to the systems by plugging his 
own laptop computer into the IFE system’s electronic boxes mounted under 
passenger seats. Once in the system, he said he was able to access other 
systems—including the jets’ Thrust Management Computer, which is 
responsible for providing power to the plane’s engines. (Ware, 2015)  
Software hacking with active systems designed to destroy, take over, or spoof 
software applications have exploded. In addition, stealthy software attacks designed to 
gather data, log keystrokes, or lay in wait for a particular event, peer connection, or timing 
event are more and more common. In short, there appears to be no end to the types of 
cyber-attacks or the combinations and permeations of those known today.  
The methods for conducting cyber warfare appear to be continuing to expand, and 
with AI-generated attacks, the differing types of attacks are likely to continue to expand. The 
proliferation of types of cyber-attacks was one of the drivers for the transition from the 
Defense Information Assurance Certification and Accreditation Program (DIACAP), which 
tended to be a terminal process once the certificate was issued, to the Risk Management 
Framework (RMF), which is a continuous risk management process. While this is a logical 
approach given the constantly advancing cyber threats, it causes more work for the PM as 
the iterative process will be examined numerous times during the developmental process. 
DoD Acquisition Cyber Exposure 
An ever-increasing number of DoD weapon systems are leveraging technology that, 
unfortunately, places them in danger of cyber-attacks. The DoD’s warfighting systems have 
degrees of dependence on GPS, communications, networks, and software, which all have 
opportunities for cyber vulnerabilities. The DoD is in the process of developing more 
extensive networks to leverage the inherent advantages with the communication 
capabilities, as well as the situational awareness that networks can provide. These more 
extensive networks will include more and more platforms, thus increasing their cyber 
vulnerabilities, as well. All of these will be extremely valuable cyber targets for adversaries. 
The advantages of the system technologies and networks will continue to be desired by the 
DoD, so planning effectively to counter cyber vulnerabilities will be a reality for system and 
network developers. 
This all means that the DoD will continue to develop systems and networks with 
inherent cyber vulnerabilities, managing those vulnerabilities with a continuous RMF 
process. This puts the program manager (PM) in a nearly constant state of cyber 
vulnerability assessment, reacting to the ever-emerging cyber threats from the vast array of 
entities involved in cyber warfare against the United States. This could potentially require 
significant time and resources to track and assess every emerging cyber threat and perform 
a vulnerability assessment on the system under development.  
The PM cannot control the emergence of new cyber threats, so must concentrate on 
what can be controlled: the system’s cyber vulnerabilities. Understanding the system’s 
vulnerabilities allows the PM to quickly and efficiently assess any new cyber threat and 
quickly perform an RMF iteration to verify the severity of the threat and any mitigation efforts 
available. The PM must identify all system potential or actual cyber vulnerabilities and take 
control of managing the design and architecture of each one. All cyber vulnerabilities must 
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be designated as a Configuration Item (CI), placing it under government control, or at least 
be treated the same way as a CI. 
Barriers to Effective Cyber Performance Design 
There are significant barriers to achieving a complete understanding of any system’s 
vulnerabilities, but overcoming these barriers is a key to being able to rapidly respond to 
new cyber threats. Any communications conducted by the system are a potential 
vulnerability, but especially wireless communications such as those used by unmanned 
aerial vehicles (UAVs), transmitting intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance systems, 
systems using GPS or other guidance/positioning information, and many autonomic systems 
that passively transmit system health data. While this seems to be rather straight forward, 
some commercial components may have communications abilities that are not apparent. For 
example, virtually all cell phones include an FM radio chip that can be activated: “That’s 
right; today’s smartphones have a built-in FM chip that gives them the ability to receive radio 
signals in your area” (OPB, n.d.). An in-depth understanding of any subsystem capable of 
transmitting or receiving information is required. 
System software development is a particular challenge in ensuring that any cyber 
vulnerability is known. The software must be engineered carefully to minimize vulnerabilities, 
and significant design and engineering needs to be included for software-intensive systems 
to be able to self-check for cyber intrusion attempts. For example, cyber vulnerabilities could 
be significantly reduced if the software application could detect and immediately report any 
attempt to modify or add software lines of code, or access to system software at all. Any 
authorized access or maintenance activities would need to have a rigorous authentication 
protocol to ensure only authorized access or changes were accepted.  
Software engineering needs to be conducted with cyber vulnerabilities as a hard 
parameter. One of the challenges in software engineering is to keep the software from 
communicating and interacting with other connected software systems or modules. The 
Boeing 737 example of accessing flight controls through the entertainment system is a good 
example of this concept. With all of the engineering discipline needed to reduce cyber 
vulnerabilities, using commercial software or reused software is extremely problematic, if not 
impossible. Any existing software to be added to the architecture of a developmental system 
would have to be thoroughly vetted and the inner working known to a very high degree. With 
most commercial software, this is not possible as the DoD does not own the data rights and 
they are most often not obtainable because there is so much of the commercial company’s 
proprietary practices evident in the code. In addition, there are a significant number of 
coders who code in what is known as a “back door” to the software that allows them access, 
bypassing the normal security protocols built into the programs.  
The National Grid could be at risk of a cyber attack after a hacker group 
linked to China create a “back door” in software used by big businesses. 
Companies at risk from this latest attack include American weapons firm 
Lockheed Martin, Russian energy supplier Gazprom and French bank 
Société Générale. (Tarrant-Cornish, 2017) 
This means that software reuse and using most commercial software would be 
nearly impossible when considering potential cyber vulnerabilities unless the engineering 
structure was completely known and verified to ensure that any potential cyber 
vulnerabilities associated with the reused code were understood and included in the risk 
management. While this seems logical, the amount of software engineering needed to 
achieve this in the reused software may actually exceed the engineering effort in the original 
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design and build of the app. Again, this presupposes that the original software is even 
accessible, which is not the case in most commercial software. 
The Challenge 
The PM must have control and insight to the system architecture, build processes, 
and verification methodologies that far surpasses the current state of practice in the DoD 
acquisition environment to gain control of known and future cyber threats.  
This challenge is exacerbated by the existing DoD acquisition environment for 
developing systems.  
Since the implementation of Acquisition Reform in the nineties, detailed 
specifications have been replaced with performance specifications in order 
to leverage the considerable experience and expertise available in the 
defense contractor base. In most hardware-centric engineering disciplines, 
the expertise that the DoD seeks to leverage, includes a mature 
engineering environment in which materials, standards, tools, techniques, 
and processes are widely accepted and implemented by industry leaders. 
This engineering maturity helps to account for derived and implied 
requirements not explicitly stated in the performance specification. 
(Naegle, 2014, p. 8) 
The DoD requirements generation system has been designed to provide the 
contractor with performance specifications to be met within some parameters. In short, the 
design control and engineering has been placed in the hands of the contractor to leverage 
the advancements obtained in the commercial sector. In the current and rapidly advancing 
cyber warfare environment, the DoD now finds that it needs to have much more positive 
control of the engineering design and build processes that it had significantly ceded to the 
contractor. 
A Way Forward 
Fortunately, there are existing analyses, tools, and techniques that can augment the 
Defense Acquisition System (DAS) to gain more insight and control over the critical cyber 
design elements. I have previously researched several of these and integrated them into the 
DAS.  
Tools, Techniques, and Processes 
The tools, techniques, and processes are briefly described as follows.  
 The Software Engineering Institute’s (SEI’s) Quality Attribute Workshop (QAW) 
 The Maintainability, Upgradability, Interoperability, Reliability, & Safety and 
Security (MUIRS) analytic technique 
 The Software Engineering Institute’s Architectural Tradeoff Analysis Methodology 
(ATAMsm) 
 The Failure Modes and Effects Criticality Analysis (FMECA) 
Quality Attribute Workshop (QAW)  
The QAW is primarily a method for more fully developing system software 
requirements and is intended to provide stakeholders’ input about their needs and 
expectations from the software (Barbacci et al., 2003, p. 1). As the system requirements are 
developed, software quality attributes are identified and become the basis for designing the 
software architecture. By adding in the desired system cyber performance as a system 
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quality attribute, software design activities will necessarily include analyses of possible 
system cyber vulnerabilities as part of the design process. 
The Software Engineering Institute’s (SEI’s) Quality Attribute Workshop (QAW) is 
implemented before the software architecture has been created and is intended to provide 
stakeholder input about their needs and expectations from the software (Naegle, 2007). The 
QAW process provides a vehicle for keeping the combat developer and user community 
involved in the DoD acquisition process, which is a key goal of that process. In addition, the 
QAW includes scenario-building processes that are essential for the software developer to 
design the software system architecture (Barbacci et al., 2003, pp. 9–11). These scenarios 
will continue to be developed and prioritized after contract award to provide context to the 
quality attribute identified for the system.  
Although the QAW would certainly be useful after contract award, conducting the 
workshop between combat developers/users and the program management office before 
issuance of the Request for Proposal (RFP) would provide an improved understanding of 
the requirements, including cyber performance, enhance the performance-specification 
preparation, and improve the ability of the prospective contractors to accurately propose the 
cost and schedule. This approach would support the goals of the System Requirements 
Review (SRR), which is designed to ascertain whether all derived and implied requirements 
have been sufficiently defined (Naegle & Petross, 2007, pp. 5–6). 
The QAW process is primarily designed to more fully develop system software 
requirements so that the government Request for Proposal (RFP) is clearer to potential 
contractors. In turn, the resulting proposals should be more accurate and realistic, reducing 
requirements and project scope creep. This is critical in communicating the cyber security 
expectations of the system so that they remain a priority when designing the system 
(Naegle, 2014, p. 25). 
Maintainability, Upgradability, Interoperability/Interfaces, Reliability, and 
Safety/Security (MUIRS) Analytic Technique 
The MUIRS analytic technique is designed to provide a framework for better 
understanding of essential supportability and safety/security aspects that the warfighter 
needs and expects, but often doesn’t communicate clearly with the capabilities-based 
JCIDS documents. This analytic technique helps compensate for the immature software 
engineering environment as the MUIRS analysis illuminates the derived and implied 
requirements that the immature environment cannot (Naegle, 2014, p. 25). 
Much of the software supportability and safety/security performance that typically 
lacks consideration and is not routinely addressed in the software engineering environment 
can be captured through development and analysis of the MUIRS elements. Analyzing the 
warfighter requirements in a QAW framework for performance in each MUIRS area will help 
stakeholders identify software quality attributes that need to be communicated to potential 
software contractors (Naegle, 2006, pp. 17–24). The system safety and security (the “S” in 
MUIRS) would certainly address the cyber performance and vulnerabilities as part of the 
analysis process. The MUIRS analysis assists the QAW process by focusing on those 
elements that are, too often, overlooked during the requirements generation process.  
MUIRS primarily addresses the immature software engineering environment as it 
provides an analytic approach for critical sustainment and safety/security attributes that are 
often missing, weakly articulated, or vaguely stated in the requirements produced. With its 
capabilities and performance-based requirements processes, the DoD significantly depends 
on mature engineering environments to “fill the gaps” left from the requirements generation 
and communication processes, but the software engineering environment is unable to do so. 
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The MUIRS analysis is also an enabler for the QAW and ATAMsm architectural processes 
discussed next (Naegle, 2014, p. 25). 
Architectural Tradeoff Analysis Methodology (ATAMsm) 
The Software Engineering Institute’s Architectural Trade-off Analysis Methodology 
ATAMSM (ATAM) is an architectural analysis tool designed to evaluate design decisions 
based on the quality attribute requirements of the system being developed. The 
methodology is a process for determining whether the quality attributes are achievable by 
the architecture as it has been conceived before enormous resources have been committed 
to that design. One of the main goals is to gain insight into how the quality attributes trade-
off against each other (Kazman et al., 2000, p. 1). Obviously, the system’s capabilities will 
necessarily be traded off with their inherent cyber vulnerabilities as part of the ATAM 
process. Those unavoidable cyber vulnerabilities will then need to be mitigated throughout 
the design of the system. 
Within the Systems Engineering Process (SEP), the ATAM provides the critical 
Requirements Loop process, tracing each requirement or quality attribute to corresponding 
functions reflected in the software architectural design. Whether ATAM or another analysis 
technique is used, this critical SEP process must be performed to ensure that functional- or 
object-oriented designs meet all stated, derived, and implied warfighter requirements. In 
complex systems development such as weapon systems, half or more than half of the total 
software development effort will be expended in the architectural design process. Therefore, 
DoD program managers must ensure that the design is addressing requirements in context 
and that the resulting architecture has a high probability of producing the specified 
warfighters’ capabilities described in the JCIDS documents, with increasing emphasis on the 
cyber performance and vulnerabilities (Naegle, 2014, pp. 26–28). 
The ATAM focuses on quality attribute requirements, so it is critical to have precise 
characterizations for each. To characterize a quality attribute, the following questions must 
be answered: 
 What are the stimuli to which the architecture must respond? 
 What is the measurable or observable manifestation of the quality attribute by 
which its achievement is judged? 
 What are the key architectural decisions that impact achieving the attribute 
requirement? (Kazman, Klein, & Clements, 2000, p. 5) 
The ATAM is designed to elicit the data and information needed to adequately 
address the three questions above. These questions, focused on requirements and quality 
attributes, are user-centric, and so the ATAM scenarios must be constructed by the user 
community (Naegle & Petross, 2007, p. 25). The methodology keys on scenario 
development in three main areas: 
 Use Case Scenarios. As the name suggests, these scenarios describe how the 
system will be used and sustained in the harshest environments envisioned. It 
includes all interoperability requirements and duty cycles as well. These user-
created scenarios convey critical cyber performance information to the system 
developer including who uses it (and how do we know that it is an authorized 
user), how they use it (does it involve communication, sensors, GPS, automated 
inputs, software, etc.), how they maintain it (e.g., would software maintenance be 
done remotely, which would be a huge cyber vulnerability, etc.), how they use it 
(does any of the use or maintenance create cyber vulnerabilities, what does it 
interoperate with, etc.), when and for how long they use and maintain it, and of 
Acquisition Research Program: 
Creating Synergy for Informed Change - 44 - 
NAVAL Postgraduate School 
course, all of the known ways that the adversary will attack the system, including 
cyber. 
 Growth Scenarios. Growth scenarios focus on known and anticipated system 
change requirements over the intended life cycle. These scenarios include 
upgrades and technology refreshments planned; interoperability requirements, 
such as inclusion in future warfighting networks; changes in sustainment 
concepts; and other system changes expected to occur over time. For each 
growth event impacting a cyber vulnerability component, a full Risk Management 
Framework iteration should be planned. 
 Exploratory Scenarios. Exploratory scenarios focus on operations in unusual or 
stressful situations. These address user expectations when the system is 
degraded or operated beyond normal limitations due to emergency created by 
combat environments. These scenarios would necessarily include operations 
while under cyber-attacks of all sorts. The exploratory scenarios include Failure 
Modes and Effects Criticality Analyses (FMECA) to identify the essential 
functions that must not fail. For the DoD, failure modes must include failures that 
are adversary induced, so understanding all vulnerabilities and how they might 
be exploited is essential to these analyses. This would obviously include cyber 
vulnerabilities of all types, which would become the basis for conducting risk 
analyses on all future types and modes of cyber-attack. 
As important to the software engineers, FMECA also identifies those enhancing 
functions that should not preclude the system from functioning when that enhancing function 
is degraded or non-operational. For example, the M1 Abrams tank uses the ambient 
temperature as an enhancer to the main gun accuracy but needs the ability to be fully 
operational in the case where the ambient temperature sensor is malfunctioning. The 
software engineers need that information to properly design the software.  
Testing 
Test cases are developed out of the scenarios, which firmly link the test program with 
the user requirements in the context of the scenarios. This methodology also helps to 
ensure that there are verification events for cyber performance, software, and sustainment 
requirements, which are too often missing from the testing program (Naegle, 2014). 
System cyber testing is extremely challenging, requiring specialized skill sets, such 
as software hackers, communications and sensor experts, and software engineers, to create 
software viruses, worms, and the cyber-attack artificial intelligence entities. In addition, 
significant resources are required to perform some of the cyber-attack scenarios like denial 
of service attacks. The challenges are exacerbated when combining different types of 
attacks in the same scenario, as cyber-attacks often do. 
It is nearly impossible to keep up with the ever-changing cyber threat environments 
that should be represented in system testing, and the potential threats created by AI-based 
cyber-attacks is nearly limitless. This makes it imperative that PMs understand and manage 
their system’s vulnerabilities, and not simply react to the latest iteration of cyber-attack. 
As shown in Figure 1, the ATAM is an integrating function for many of the tools and 
techniques discussed here. It is designed to be an iterative process and would be most 
effective when started in early concept development, then continued through contract 
award, prototyping, and into the design review process. 
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Figure 1. Quality Attribution Workshop and Architectural Tradeoff Analysis 
Methodology Integration Into Life-Cycle Management 
(Naegle & Petross, 2007, p. 25) 
The ATAM process addresses four primary problem areas: 
 The scenario development provides much more operational context than the 
typical Operational Mission Statement/Mission Profile (OMS/MP) provides. This 
level of detail helps to compensate for the immature software engineering 
environment and is critical for the proper design of the software architecture. The 
details provided by the ATAM scenarios helps to inform system designers to 
potential cyber vulnerabilities and is critical to the discovery process and 
optimizing the cyber design. 
 The ATAM serves as a very effective software design metric function. With the 
software development team using 50% or more of the available resources for 
requirements analysis and software design before the Preliminary Design Review 
(PDR), it is critical to have an effective software design metrics function. Any 
significant redesign is extremely costly in both funding and schedule. If the 
design is reacting to cyber threats, the design process will be in chaos. 
Traditional software design metrics focus on the design complexity and do not 
address whether the design is adequate. ATAM directly links the user 
requirements to the system architectural design. 
 As the testing program is developed from the scenarios, it becomes difficult to 
omit any critical testing event. In addition, the system developer understands the 
tests or verification events that must be passed for user acceptance. This would 
feed the Risk Management Framework the valuable information needed to 
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assess the system’s cyber performance. It would also help identify cyber 
vulnerabilities and create mitigation actions. 
 By integrating the MUIRS analyses into the ATAM scenario development, 
sustainability and safety/security aspects cannot easily be omitted from the 
system design. As the testing plan flows from the scenarios, the MUIRS design 
elements will have corresponding test or verification events identified in the test 
plan. All of the MUIRS elements need to be considered for cyber vulnerabilities 
and the safety and security should help drive the cyber performance design 
(Naegle, 2014, pp. 28–29). 
Failure Modes and Effects Criticality Analysis (FMECA) 
As the title indicates, this analysis methodology is designed to identify system failure 
modes, to identify the effects of those failures on the system, and to ascertain the relative 
criticality of that type of failure. In his book titled Logistics Engineering and Management, 
Benjamin S. Blanchard (2004) describes FMECA as follows: 
Given a description, both in functional and physical terms, the 
designer needs to be able to evaluate a system relative to possible failures, 
the anticipated modes and expected frequency of failure, their causes, their 
consequences and impact(s) on the system overall, and areas where 
preventative measures can be initiated to preclude such failures in the 
future. (p. 275)  
He goes on to state, “The FMECA is an excellent design tool, and it can be applied in the 
development or assessment of any product or process” (Blanchard, 2004, pp. 275– 276). 
Including ATAM FMECA scenarios with the software systems and subsystems 
provides architectural design cues to software engineers. These scenarios provide analysis 
for designing redundant systems for mission-critical elements, “safe mode” operations for 
survivability- and safety-related systems, and drive the software engineer to conduct “what 
if” analyses with a superior understanding of failure-mode scenarios. For example, nearly all 
military aircraft are “fly-by-wire,” with no physical connection between the pilot controls and 
the aircraft-control surfaces, so basic software avionic functions must be provided in the 
event of damage or power-loss situations to give the pilot the ability to perform basic flight 
and navigation functions. Obviously, this would be a major design driver for the software 
architect (Naegle & Petross, 2007). 
The primary problem areas addressed by FMECA include requirements clarification 
and prioritization, and helping to ensure a sound architecture design. This analysis also 
ensures that the most critical software systems are designed with the requisite reliability and 
will continue to function in degraded modes (Naegle, 2014, pp. 29–30). 
The user needs to describe what is expected from the system when a cyber-attack 
occurs. For example, does the system actively counter the attack or merely report the attack 
to operators? How does the system detect and report passive cyber-attacks? What happens 
to system operations when remote nodes lose user authentication, and how is connectivity 
eventually restored? What actions will be taken in a denial of service attack? All known 
system cyber vulnerabilities need to be included in the exploratory scenarios, as this gives a 
baseline for reacting to emerging cyber threats.  
As previously stated, one of the main functions of performing FMECA is to identify 
those software functions that are not critical, and to ensure that failures or anomalies in 
those non-critical functions do not preclude or negatively affect system capabilities. Today’s 
systems typically have numerous enhancing functions that improve performance but are not 
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critical, and the software developers have no way to discern the difference between a critical 
system and an enhancing one without employing FMECA. In addition to identifying those 
non-essential functions, cyber vulnerability analyses need to be conducted on these non-
essential systems as they are a prime target for cyber-attack. Hackers attempt to find the 
path of least resistance to affect a system’s operations, and this path is often through non-
essential functions similar to the hacker going through the in-flight entertainment system to 
access the 737 engine controls. 
Integrating the Tools, Techniques, and Analyses 
All of the tools, techniques, and analyses presented in this research must integrate 
with the existing Defense Acquisition System, or they will not be useful for DoD PMs. Figure 
2 depicts how they integrate in the development of the system from the user requirements 
towards the Critical Design review (CDR). 
 
 
Figure 2. Tools, Techniques, and Analyses Integration Into Design Activities 
Figure 2 shows how the government (green) controls the early functions and then 
monitors the contractor (blue) efforts in the system design process. The QAW is part of the 
requirements development process and assists in the requirements translation into the 
performance specification for the Request for Proposal (RFP). The requirements are 
formally set in the Systems Engineering Process (SEP) at the System Functional Review 
(SFR) depicted in the figure. The ATAM becomes an integral process within the Design 
Review (purple) iterative process and serves as the government’s input during the early 
design reviews. The ATAM assists with the contractor’s architectural design process and the 
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ATAM test case development contributes to the development of both the contractor and the 
government testing concept development. With the proper focus on cyber performance, the 
system will be designed from the initiation with cyber at the forefront and the testing concept 
will provide validation of cyber vulnerability mitigation efforts. The purposeful design with 
traceable cyber elements and associated testing validation fully supports the tenets of the 
RMF depicted in Figure 3. 
 
 
Figure 3. The DoD Risk Management Framework (RMF) 
(DoD, 2015, p. 4) 
As depicted in Figure 3, the RMF is a continuous and iterative process to continually 
assess the cyber security aspects of a system. Following the RMF steps, it is clear that the 
addition of the tools, techniques, and analyses to the DAS provides a method to conduct the 
RMF assessment from concept to implementation. In step 5, “Authorize,” the system’s Plan 
of Action and Mitigation (POA&M) is submitted as part of the security authorization package 
to the authorizing official (AO), who makes the final cyber risk determination and 
authorization for the system. 
Conclusions and Recommendations 
The explosive growth of cyber-attack types and variations, especially with the advent 
of AI-generated attack modes, makes it nearly impossible to be reactive to new threats. To 
avoid reacting to every new cyber threat, PMs must thoroughly understand and manage 
their system’s cyber vulnerabilities. To achieve this, PMs must exercise much more control 
over their system’s architectural design than is currently anticipated with the Defense 
Acquisition System (DAS), which cedes much of the design control to the contractor.  
System components that are particularly vulnerable to cyber threats must be 
designated as Configuration Items and the design and configuration management must be 
completely controlled by the government. These include any components that have 
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communications ability, system sensors, virtually all system software, and any other 
components deemed to have cyber vulnerabilities. This has significant implications for using 
commercial components and software, or even reuse of software. To understand the 
system’s cyber vulnerabilities, the system component architecture, including software, must 
be thoroughly understood and controlled. To achieve this in software, the total code 
architecture must be known and most commercial software will not allow that level of 
access, as it is considered proprietary. Commercial software data rights are typically 
unobtainable. Even if data rights could be obtained, the level of engineering effort required 
to understand the inherent cyber vulnerabilities may exceed the effort to actually build the 
software from scratch, reducing or eliminating the acquisition cost advantage. 
The tools, techniques, and analyses presented in this research augment the DAS to 
help the PM gain visibility and control of the system design, which is necessary to gain a 
complete inventory of system cyber vulnerabilities. Effective application of these tools, 
techniques, and analyses helps inform the Risk Management Framework (RMF) cyber 
vulnerability assessment techniques, which is what the RMF authorizing official needs to 
make the final risk assessment and authorization for the system under consideration. 
MUIRS (Maintainability, Upgradeability, Interoperability, Reliability, and 
Safety/Security) Analyses 
The MUIRS analyses was designed to help compensate for the DoD requirements 
generation shortcomings, which too often omit or vaguely articulate performance in each 
one of these areas even though they are important to the warfighter and impact the system 
Total Ownership Cost (TOC) significantly. The MUIRS elements also include areas where 
cyber vulnerabilities may exist and these analyses will likely help identify areas for cyber 
vigilance.  
QAW (Software Engineering Institute’s Quality Attribute Workshop) 
While the QAW is a software-oriented technique, it is highly effective in fully 
developing a system’s requirements, including the requirements for cyber performance. It 
was designed to help identify a more complete inventory of requirements, including derived 
and implied requirements not well identified or defined from the JCIDS and RFP 
Performance Specification processes. Including the MUIRS analyses as part of the QAW, 
the resulting requirements inventory is more complete and helps identify potential cyber 
vulnerabilities to be managed and mitigated. 
ATAM (Software Engineering Institute’s Architectural Trade-Off Analysis 
Methodologysm ) 
Another software-oriented methodology, ATAM is designed to more fully develop the 
system operational and lifecycle context needed to produce a far superior architectural 
design, especially in software. ATAM is most effective when it integrates the QAW and 
MUIRS processes. It features user-produced scenarios providing operational context detail 
not typically provided in the government-generated Operational Mode Summary/Mission 
Profile (OMS/MP), but absolutely essential for the software engineer to design an effective 
software system. The scenario development is extremely valuable in identifying potential 
areas for cyber vigilance including use cases, growth cases that can identify future 
interoperability needs and technology refreshment events, and exploratory scenarios that 
identify user expectations while the system is under attack, including cyber-attack. The 
exploratory scenarios include system FMECA (Failure Modes and Effects Criticality 
Analysis) scenarios, which can identify both critical and non-critical systems and functions 
that may reveal potential cyber vulnerabilities. 
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FMECA (Failure Modes and Effects Criticality Analysis) 
The “failure modes” analyses include failure modes induced by adversaries through 
attacks or intrusion into the systems, so includes cyber warfare as part of the analyses. The 
“effects” analyses may help in developing cyber vulnerability mitigation strategies. The 
“criticality” analyses are designed to separate the critical from the non-critical failure modes, 
but may also help find non-critical systems that pose substantial cyber vulnerabilities as 
adversaries seek non-critical systems for cyber-attack as they typically have weaker or non-
existent cyber defense mechanisms. 
Summary 
Integrating these tools, techniques, and analyses into the defense acquisition system 
provides the PM a far superior ability to identify, control, and mitigate the system cyber 
vulnerabilities in a cost-effective manner. Managing the system vulnerabilities is a better 
strategy than reacting to the constantly emerging cyber threats and fully supports the DoD 
Risk Management Framework tenets. 
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